win:security 4768
A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested.
- Log source
- Windows Security event log
- Host type
- Windows (workstation, member server, domain controller)
- How to enable
- Advanced Audit Policy: Account Logon > Audit Kerberos Authentication Service
- Audit category
- Account Logon
- Audit subcategory
- Audit Kerberos Authentication Service
- Tier, host type
- Minimum
- Techniques
- 6
- Rules depending on it
- Splunk 10, Sigma 3, Elastic 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1
Why this tier
Microsoft audit baseline (dc)
By role
| Role | Tier | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Windows domain controller | Minimum | Microsoft audit baseline (dc) |
Techniques it helps detect
Rules that depend on it
Splunk 10
- Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption
- Kerberos User Enumeration
- PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request
- Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request
- Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket
- Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos
- Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos
- Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Authentication
- Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos
- Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos
Sigma 3
- Kerberos Manipulation by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
- PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request by Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag
- Potential AS-REP Roasting via Kerberos TGT Requests by ANosir
Elastic 2
Microsoft Sentinel 1
Standards and guidance naming it
| Requirement | Relation | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| OMB M-26-14: Attack vectors and lateral movementAppendix B item 5(10) | Supports an activity | our analysis: Kerberos TGT requests |
| Microsoft: Events to monitor with potential criticalityAppendix L: Events to Monitor (Windows Server AD DS best practices) | Names this event | potential criticality Low: A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested. |