win:security 4624
An account was successfully logged on.
- Log source
- Windows Security event log
- Host type
- Windows (workstation, member server, domain controller)
- How to enable
- Advanced Audit Policy: Logon/Logoff > Audit Logon
- Audit category
- Logon/Logoff
- Audit subcategory
- Audit Logon
- Tier, host type
- Minimum
- Techniques
- 34
- Rules depending on it
- Splunk 10, Sigma 15, Elastic 15, Microsoft Sentinel 15
Why this tier
DISA STIG (server); DISA STIG (workstation); Microsoft audit baseline (dc); Microsoft audit baseline (server); Microsoft audit baseline (workstation); NSA
By role
| Role | Tier | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Windows workstation | Minimum | DISA STIG (workstation); Microsoft audit baseline (workstation); NSA |
| Windows member server | Minimum | DISA STIG (server); Microsoft audit baseline (server); NSA |
| Windows domain controller | Minimum | DISA STIG (server); Microsoft audit baseline (dc); Microsoft audit baseline (server); NSA |
| Windows web server (IIS), internet-facing | Minimum | DISA STIG (server); Microsoft audit baseline (server); NSA |
Techniques it helps detect
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol
- T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- T1021.003 Distributed Component Object Model
- T1021.005 VNC
- T1021.006 Windows Remote Management
- T1037.001 Logon Script (Windows)
- T1070.005 Network Share Connection Removal
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1078.001 Default Accounts
- T1078.002 Domain Accounts
- T1078.003 Local Accounts
- T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
- T1185 Browser Session Hijacking
- T1189 Drive-by Compromise
- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1480 Execution Guardrails
- T1480.001 Environmental Keying
- T1505.003 Web Shell
- T1534 Internal Spearphishing
- T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material
- T1550.002 Pass the Hash
- T1550.003 Pass the Ticket
- T1552.001 Credentials In Files
- T1556.001 Domain Controller Authentication
- T1558.003 Kerberoasting
- T1563 Remote Service Session Hijacking
- T1563.002 RDP Hijacking
- T1606 Forge Web Credentials
- T1606.001 Web Cookies
- T1606.002 SAML Tokens
- T1657 Financial Theft
- T1684 Social Engineering
- T1684.001 Impersonation
Rules that depend on it
Splunk 10
- Detect Password Spray Attack Behavior From Source
- Detect Password Spray Attack Behavior On User
- Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events
- Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account
- Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location
- Windows AD Short Lived Domain Controller SPN Attribute
- Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon
- Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing
- Windows RDP Login Session Was Established
- Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts
Sigma 15
- Admin User Remote Logon by juju4
- DiagTrackEoP Default Login Username by Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
- External Remote RDP Logon from Public IP by Micah Babinski (@micahbabinski), Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
- External Remote SMB Logon from Public IP by Micah Babinski (@micahbabinski), Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
- Hacktool Ruler by Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
- Metasploit SMB Authentication by Chakib Gzenayi (@Chak092), Hosni Mribah
- Outgoing Logon with New Credentials by Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)
- Pass the Hash Activity 2 by Dave Kennedy, Jeff Warren (method) / David Vassallo (rule)
- Potential Access Token Abuse by Michaela Adams, Zach Mathis
- Potential Privilege Escalation via Local Kerberos Relay over LDAP by Elastic, @SBousseaden
- Potential Remote WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers Activity by Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
- RDP Login from Localhost by Thomas Patzke
- RottenPotato Like Attack Pattern by @SBousseaden, Florian Roth
- Successful Account Login Via WMI by Thomas Patzke
- Successful Overpass the Hash Attempt by Roberto Rodriguez (source), Dominik Schaudel (rule)
Elastic 15
- Account Password Reset Remotelyinferred
- First Time Seen NewCredentials Logon Processinferred
- Interactive Logon by an Unusual Processinferred
- Multiple Logon Failure Followed by Logon Successinferred
- Multiple Logon Failure from the same Source Addressinferred
- Potential Account Takeover - Logon from New Source IPinferred
- Potential Account Takeover - Mixed Logon Typesinferred
- Potential Computer Account NTLM Relay Activity
- Potential Kerberos Relay Attack against a Computer Account
- Potential NTLM Relay Attack against a Computer Account
- Potential Pass-the-Hash (PtH) Attemptinferred
- Privileged Accounts Brute Forceinferred
- Process Creation via Secondary Logoninferred
- Remote Windows Service Installedinferred
- Service Creation via Local Kerberos Authenticationinferred
Microsoft Sentinel 15
- Brute force attack against user credentials (Uses Authentication Normalization)inferred
- EatonForeseer - Unauthorized Logins
- Failed AzureAD logons but success logon to host
- Gain Code Execution on ADFS Server via Remote WMI Execution
- Gain Code Execution on ADFS Server via SMB + Remote Service or Scheduled Task
- Multiple RDP connections from Single System
- Non Domain Controller Active Directory Replication
- Potential Password Spray Attack (Uses Authentication Normalization)inferred
- Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling
- RDP Nesting
- Rare RDP Connections
- SecurityEvent - Multiple authentication failures followed by a success
- Sign-ins from IPs that attempt sign-ins to disabled accounts (Uses Authentication Normalization)inferred
- Starting or Stopping HealthService to Avoid Detection
- User login from different countries within 3 hours (Uses Authentication Normalization)inferred
Standards and guidance naming it
| Requirement | Relation | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| OMB M-26-14: Attack vectors and lateral movementAppendix B item 5(10) | Supports an activity | our analysis: logon type 3 and 10 show lateral movement |
| DISA STIG: Advanced audit policy requirementsMicrosoft Windows 11 V2R11 (2026-10-05) | Names this event | WN11-AU-000070 (workstation): Audit Logon Failure |
| DISA STIG: Advanced audit policy requirementsMicrosoft Windows 11 V2R11 (2026-10-05) | Names this event | WN11-AU-000075 (workstation): Audit Logon Success |
| DISA STIG: Advanced audit policy requirementsMicrosoft Windows Server 2022 V2R11 | Names this event | WN22-AU-000190 (server): Audit Logon Success |
| DISA STIG: Advanced audit policy requirementsMicrosoft Windows Server 2022 V2R11 | Names this event | WN22-AU-000200 (server): Audit Logon Failure |
| DISA STIG: Advanced audit policy requirementsMicrosoft Windows 10 V3R6 (2026-01-23) | Names this event | WN10-AU-000070 (workstation): Audit Logon Failure |
| DISA STIG: Advanced audit policy requirementsMicrosoft Windows 10 V3R6 (2026-01-23) | Names this event | WN10-AU-000075 (workstation): Audit Logon Success |
| DISA STIG: Advanced audit policy requirementsMicrosoft Windows Server 2019 V3R9 (2026-07-10) | Names this event | WN19-AU-000190 (server): Audit Logon Success |
| DISA STIG: Advanced audit policy requirementsMicrosoft Windows Server 2019 V3R9 (2026-07-10) | Names this event | WN19-AU-000200 (server): Audit Logon Failure |
| DISA STIG: Advanced audit policy requirementsMicrosoft Windows Server 2025 V1R1 (2026-02-27) | Names this event | WN25-AU-000190 (server): Audit Logon Success |
| DISA STIG: Advanced audit policy requirementsMicrosoft Windows Server 2025 V1R1 (2026-02-27) | Names this event | WN25-AU-000200 (server): Audit Logon Failure |
| NSA: Recommended Windows events to forwardEvent Forwarding Guidance (RecommendedEvents.csv) | Names this event | Account Usage: Successful User Account Login |
| Microsoft: Events to monitor with potential criticalityAppendix L: Events to Monitor (Windows Server AD DS best practices) | Names this event | potential criticality Low: An account was successfully logged on. |
EDR events that stand in for it
Full: the sensor event carries what this event carries. Partial: the sensor reports a subset, so it does not replace the event.
| Product | Sensor event | Fidelity | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint device tables | DeviceLogonEvents | Full | pySigma-backend-kusto: logon -> DeviceLogonEvents (ActionType LogonSuccess, named in Sentinel rules); logon type and remote address present |
| CrowdStrike Falcon sensor telemetry (FDR event_simpleName) | UserLogon | Partial | our analysis: UserLogon is a sensor event in the FDR feed; interactive and network logons are reported, logon type semantics differ from Security 4624 |
| Elastic Defend endpoint events | authentication | Partial | Elastic Defend authentication events on Windows are the Security log read by the agent, not sensor telemetry |