T1057
Process Discovery
What it is
Attackers list the programs running on a host to learn what it does and which security tools are watching it. It is a technique under the Discovery tactic. A process listing often comes just before an attempt to stop or avoid an antivirus, endpoint agent or backup service, so it can warn of what the attacker plans next.
How adversaries use it
The attacker runs built-in commands such as tasklist on Windows, ps on Linux, or Get-Process in PowerShell, sometimes with options that show each process's account or services. They read the list for security products, remote access tools and applications worth targeting, then choose what to stop, avoid or inject into.
Detect it in Elastic
Data source: Windows and Linux process creation events
Key fields
event.code: 1 (Sysmon) or 4688 (Windows Security) on Windows; event.action: executed on Linux (Auditbeat) process.name: the listing tool, such as tasklist.exe or ps process.command_line (Windows) or process.args (Linux): the options used process.parent.name: what started it (on Linux, Elastic Defend only; Auditbeat records only the parent's process ID) user.name: the account that ran it host.name, @timestamp
Example event
{
"host": {
"name": "ws-214.corp.example"
},
"user": {
"name": "m.castell"
},
"event": {
"code": "1"
},
"process": {
"name": "tasklist.exe",
"parent": {
"name": "wscript.exe"
},
"command_line": "tasklist /v"
},
"@timestamp": "2026-05-14T09:34:12.477Z"
}Prebuilt Elastic rule: Process Discovery Using Built-in Tools
Hunt guidance
Start with process listings: process.name: "tasklist.exe" or (process.name: "ps" and process.args: "aux"). Then look at what the same account did in the next few minutes. Look for a listing followed by an attempt to stop a security product or service, a listing run by a script or a remote session rather than a person at the keyboard, and listings in a burst with other discovery commands.
Ruling out legitimate activity
Support staff, administrators and monitoring tools list processes routinely. Check whether the account normally troubleshoots hosts, whether the parent is an expected tool, and what followed. A listing on its own is weak evidence; a listing followed by a security tool stopping is strong.
Telemetry needed
The log events that help detect this technique, from the Telemetry reference: which log source to collect, which event in it, and how to enable each one.
- ESXi and vCenter logs (the log as a whole)
- Linux audit framework (auditd)
- SYSCALL:execve SYSCALL record for execve
- SYSCALL:openat SYSCALL record for openat
- osquery (Linux) (the log as a whole)
- osquery (macOS) (the log as a whole)
- macOS unified log (the log as a whole)
- Network device logs (syslog, CLI/AAA, config, SNMP) (the log as a whole)
- Windows Security event log
- 4688 A new process has been created.
- Sysmon
- 10 ProcessAccess
References
Practice it
No range covers this technique yet; the write-up above landed first. Ranges are added continuously; the ones live today are on the training ladder.